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Of all the possible mothering

paradigms I could count-birth mother, biological mother, child-raising
mother, legally recognized mother-I would fill three of the roles. I had
to settle 1for three-quarters his mother. That seemed like more than
enough."
I. INTRODUCTION
When a woman in California gave birth in early 2009 to octuplets due to
the implantation of multiple cryopreserved embryos, many people began to
debate the legal, ethical, medical, and practical issues relating to maternity
in the twenty-first century. 2 Over the last decade, the ability of medical
reproductive science to produce children by assisted reproductive
technology ("ART") has forced society to focus on issues of maternity,
whereas previously, only legal and social issues relating to paternity were
matters of concern. Over a decade ago, a judge on the Arizona Appeals
Court wrote that the issue of maternity "seems to present no great practical
problem because maternal identity always seems to be a given fact." 3 The
increased use of assisted reproductive technology in subsequent years has
challenged Judge Gerber's confidence in 1995 that maternal identity is
always a given fact. The 1999 edition of Black's Law Dictionary defined
"mother" as "a woman who has given birth to or legally adopted a child."4
Five years later the definition of mother was expanded to read: "a woman
' 5
who has given birth to, provided the egg for, or legally adopted a child.
Other definitions of mother included biological mother, birth mother,
genetic mother, gestational mother, intended mother, natural mother, and
surrogate mother.6
In the age of assisted reproductive technology 7 and collaborative
reproduction, defining maternity is no longer as simple as it once was. It
1. Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008 (Magazine),

at 42 (containing one woman's reflections on her use of a gestational surrogate to carry
a child which was genetically that of herself and her husband).

2. See Betsy McKay, In- Vitro FertilizationLimit Is Sought, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,

2009, at A3 (reporting that a Georgia bill introduced in response to the "Octomom"
would limit the number of embryos that a doctor may implant in a woman to two).
3. Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (Gerber, J.,
concurring).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (7th ed. 1999).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (8th ed. 2004).
6. See id. (listing other terms of "maternity" including adoptive mother, de facto
mother, foster mother, godmother, psychological mother, and stepmother).
7. See Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers,
Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 19-20 (2008) (defining
assisted reproductive technology as the use of any medical technology to cause
pregnancy by means other than sexual intercourse).
8. See Alexa E. King, Comment, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthoodin the
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is for that reason that the new American Bar Association Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology 9 ("Model Act") does not
define "mother," but simply defines a parent of either gender as "an
individual who has established a parent-child relationship under this act or
other law," 10 and defines parental rights and obligations in the specific
context of various forms of reproductive technology."
Until recent years, parentage cases typically involved issues relating to
paternity. Since the birth mother was also the genetic mother it followed
that she was also the legal mother and there was no practical reason to
dispute maternity. 12 Of course, the idea of "mother" has always been
subject to various shades of meaning based in large part on diverse cultural,
political, and religious influences. 3 But with the development of assisted
Context of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 341 (1995)

(describing collaborative reproduction as a form of assisted reproduction by which an

individual other than one who is an intended parent provides either genetic materials or
serves as a surrogate carrier).
9. See generally MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. prefatory note
(2008) (adopting the Act to create legal standards for the use and storage of gametes
and embryos while addressing social concerns).
10. Id. § 102(25).
11. See id. prefatory note (noting that the ABA enacted the Model Act to give

assisted reproductive technology participants guidance due to the lack of state
legislation addressing the balance of interests of the intended parents, the gamete
donors, the gestational carrier, and most importantly the child and family); cf Laura A.
Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of
Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy, 39 CATH.
LAW. 241, 244, 257-58 (1999) (describing that when states lack legislation on ART,

case law often leaves gaps on parties' duties and responsibilities); Adam P. Plant, With

a Little Help from My Friends: The Intersection of the Gestational CarrierSurrogacy
Agreement, Legislative Inaction,and MedicalAdvancements, 54 ALA. L. REV. 639, 655

(2003) (believing that legislation is the proper method for developing a legal
framework on ART due to statutory safeguards that establish the responsibilities of all

parties); Kevin Tuininga, The Ethics of Surrogacy Contracts and Nebraska's
Surrogacy Law, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 188 (2008) (urging a thorough discussion

of ART in the Nebraska legislature due to a lack of debate during the passage of the
surrogacy laws and recent technological advances); Christine A. Bjorkman, Note,

Sitting in Limbo: The Absence of Connecticut Regulation of Surrogate Parenting
Agreements and Its Effect on Parties to the Agreement, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 141,

167 (2008) (recommending that Connecticut reexamine the need for legislation
regarding ART in light of changes in society and advances in medical technology).
12. See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Tenn. 2005) (noting that historically,
maternity was considered beyond doubt because the gestational mother was also the
genetic mother).
13. See

GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS FROM THE

124-25 (1993) (noting the Christian idea of
virginal motherhood embodied in Mary, the mother of Jesus); John Lawrence Hill,
MIDDLE AGES TO EIGHTEEN-SEVENTY

What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims ofBiology as the Basisfor Parental
Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 359-62 (1991) (describing the limitations in the

definition of a parent in terms of biological, lexical, social and cultural definitions);

Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALl Domestic Partner
Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 353, 365

(2004) [hereinafter Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less] (explaining that at
common law, a child born out of wed ock had no legal mother or father because he or
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reproductive technology in recent decades, especially the growth of
gestational surrogacy, the old verities are no longer simple to apply. 14 A
comment in the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 notes that with regard to
the use of a gestational carrier to bear and deliver a child for the intended
parents, "medical science has raced ahead of the law without heed to the
views of the general public or legislators."' 5 The absence of statutory law
governing determination of maternity strongly suggests the need for
clarifying legislation, particularly considering the rapid increase in the use
of assisted reproduction over the past decade.' 6 This article provides
examples of the problems courts have encountered in determining
maternity; it also examines how the Model Act could be used to
disentangle the maternity rights issues arising in surrogacy and other
assisted reproduction cases if the Act becomes law.
II. ANALYSIS
The best way to understand the impact which assisted reproduction has
had on our thinking about maternity is to consider the various kinds of
procreative choices now available to women because of this technology.
The evolution of ART has not only revolutionized reproductive medicine,
but has also created a novel set of legal questions. Many of these questions
have not yet been answered in any commonly agreed upon manner and
promise to continue to be raised in legal cases in the coming years. The
options range from the traditional situation where the birth mother is also
the legal mother, to the various forms of surrogacy which have separated
birth from intended parenthood, the use of genetic tests for parenthood, the
gradual development of intent as a basis for determining maternity, the
sharing of maternity by female same-sex couples, to maternity after a
mother's death. Each of these possibilities will be examined in this article.
she was filius nullius, the child of no one); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-

Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 489, 493, 510 (1990)
[hereinafter Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers] (advancing the idea that a
new definition of paternity and maternity called psychological parenthood should be
developed in place of traditional definitions based on biology or adoption).
14. See, e.g., Krista Sirola, Comment, Are You My Mother: Defending the Rights of

Intended Parents in Gestation Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 131, 160 (2006) (asserting that Pennsylvania's ruling in J.F.

v. D.B indicates the popularity and trend of surrogacy arrangements as well as the need
for a set of standards for resolving disputes).
15. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 2000 Art. 8 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001 &
Supp. 2008).
16. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.,

NAT'L

SUMMARY

&

FERTILITY

CLINIC

REPORTS,

2005,

ASSISTED

61 (2007) (reporting that between 1996
and 2005, the number of children born as the result of assisted reproductive technology
in the United States increased by 150% from 20,840 to 52,041).
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES
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A. Motherhood and Surrogacy
Most of the legal controversy over maternity to date has arisen from the
practice of surrogacy. This is understandable since typically a surrogacy
arrangement constitutes a separation of birth from intended parenthood,
which strikes directly at the traditional concept that giving birth equates to
legal maternity. This section of the article will examine various aspects of
this dilemma.
1. Maternityand the Birth Mother
Until recent decades maternity issues only rarely arose in legal
disputes.17 The obvious reason for the lack of parentage disputes involving
maternity, outside of adoption situations, was based on the simple two-fold
facts of reproductive biology, namely that (1) the legal mother was the birth8
mother and (2) she had a genetic connection to the child she had birthed.'
Stated simply,
[u]ntil very recently, determining a newborn's legal mother was
relatively simple: when a pregnant woman gave birth to a child, it was
irrefutable that she was the child's mother, the 'presumption of biology.'
The ancient maxim mater est quam gestation demonstrat (by gestation
the mother is demonstrated) illustrates this presumption. 19
As late as the promulgation of the original Uniform Parentage Act in
1973, maternity was "established by proof of [a woman] having given
birth, 20 although, "or under this Act" 21 was added to the definition of
maternity to deal with the potential rare case involving a parental challenge
to the status of an alleged birth mother, as might happen when a hospital
maternity clinic mixes up the identity of a child.
The federal law governing parentage, therefore, focused on paternity,
taking maternal status for granted in light of gestation.2 In fact, maternity
was given such short shrift in the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act that it
17. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws. Legislating in the Culture of
Life, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 771 (2006) (noting that a majority of states have enacted
safe haven laws providing mothers that abandon their child with immunity from
prosecution); Peter M. Warren, O.C. Hospital Acts to End Baby Mix-Up, L.A. TiMES,
Feb. 23, 1999, at 1 (reporting that a hospital baby mix-up highlighted the need for an
electronic security system despite the fact that baby mix-ups do not occur frequently).
18. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies
and the Concept of Parenthood,39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 97 (1998) (contending
that because historically gestation proved genetic parentage, there was never a need to
distinguish between gestational and genetic mothers).
19. Sara K. Alexander, Note, Who Is Georgia'sMother? GestationalSurrogacy: A
Formulationfor Georgia'sLegislature, 38 GA. L. REv. 395, 397 (2003).
20. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 3(1), 9B U.L.A. 391 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
21. Id. §§ 3(1), 11 (permitting blood testing to prove parentage).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2006) (reporting that paternity can be established through
genetic testing or voluntary acknowledgment).
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contained no specific procedures for determining maternity other than
stating that some of the paternity procedures could also be used to
determine a "mother and child relationship. ' 23 This statutory focus on the
determination of paternity was thus typical of the situation which existed
before the widespread use of in vitro fertilization and gestational
surrogacy.2 4
2. Maternity andSurrogacy
Establishing maternity by virtue of a woman giving birth was a rule
of convenience which could be easily administered and applied in resolving
disputes. The rule could also be easily applied to the rare cases in which
maternal status became an issue. Before the development of assisted
reproductive technologies, the law created a presumption that the birth
mother was the legal mother.25 The fact that the birth mother was also the
genetic mother made that rule supportable as a matter of policy. Thus, in
the first "traditional" surrogacy cases involving a dispute over maternity,
the court could logically determine that the gestating woman was the legal
mother because she was both the birth mother and the genetic mother.26
The most famous of such cases was the New Jersey Supreme Court
decision In re Baby M, which involved a woman who conceived and gave
birth to a child with the sperm of the intended father by intrauterine
insemination which fertilized her egg. 27 After the birth of "Baby M" the
birth mother claimed to also be the legal mother, even though the purpose
of the surrogacy arrangement was to create a child for the father and his
wife. An action was brought to enforce the surrogacy contract and the trial
court granted the relief asked for, terminated the birth mother's maternal
rights as provided in the agreement, and granted the father's wife a decree
of adoption as the intended mother. 28 However, this judgment was
23. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 21, 9B U.L.A. 494 (2001 & Supp. 2008).

24. See id. § 21 cmt. (acknowledging that sections four to twenty of the U.P.A.
were devoted to the ascertainment of paternity rather than maternity, but that a judge
should apply the paternity sections to maternity disputes).
25. See Malina Coleman, Gestation,Intent and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in
the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 497, 524 (1996)
(asserting that unless a statute modifies the rule, common law presumes the birth
mother is the child's legal mother).
26. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN,
JR. &
MAUREEN MCBRIEN,
ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE

131 (2006) (defining "traditional surrogacy" as when the surrogate carrier is also the
genetic mother, distinguishable from gestational agreements in which, by virtue of
embryo implantation or transfer, the birth mother has no genetic connection to the
child).
27. See 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988) (upholding the maternal rights of the
traditional surrogate).
28. See id. at 1238, 1243 (stating that the lower court erred in applying the "best
interest" standard because the standard is insufficient to terminate maternal rights).
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reversed on appeal. 29 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the birth
mother was the legal mother of the child, not the contractual intended
mother. 30 The Baby Mdecision was soon followed by a California decision
in which a traditional surrogate carrier was held to be the legal mother of
the child she had conceived with the intended father's sperm by intrauterine
insemination pursuant to a surrogacy agreement, since she was both the
birth mother and the genetic mother. 31 The New Jersey and California
decisions in these cases suggested that the use of a traditional surrogate to
produce a child for another woman was extremely risky since the courts
might be unwilling to enforce the terms of a preconception surrogacy
contract by waiving maternal rights when a surrogate carrier was both the
birth mother and the genetic mother of the child.32
However justifiable, the early traditional surrogacy decisions were
relying on a dual birth mother/genetic mother test. It quickly became
apparent though that the test did not work in disputes involving gestational
surrogacy contracts in which the gestational carrier had no genetic
connection to the child. The development of embryo transfer technology
created the potential for transferring an already fertilized egg provided by
someone other than the birth mother. 33 In such cases a gestational carrier is
a birth mother who has no genetic connection to the child she bears since
the fertilized egg implanted
in her was produced either by an egg donor or
34
by the intended mother.
Once gestational surrogacy became medically possible by embryo
transfer, the issue of the maternal status of the birth mother came to the
courts. A California Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. Calvert, involved

a claim by a gestational carrier who gestated an egg carrying the genetic
29. See id. at 1243 (stressing that a court cannot terminate maternal rights unless

there is strong evidence of neglect or abandonment).
30. See id. at 1246 (nullifying the surrogacy contract partly because it contradicts
the statute which limits a birth mother's ability to irrevocably consent to waiving her

parental rights to one instance: surrendering custody to an approved agency or New
Jersey's Divison of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS")).

31. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 901 (Cal. Ct. App.

1994) (ruling in a divorce matter that the husband and the traditional surrogate canrer,

not the wife of the father, were parents of the child).
32. See Jami L. Zehr, Comment, Using Gestational Surrogacy and PreImplantation Genetic Diagnosis:Are Intended ParentsNow Manufacturing the Idyllic
Infant?, 20 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 294, 304-05 (2008) (noting that under the New
Jersey Supreme Court's ruling, surrogate contracts where the surrogate carrier is birth
and genetic mother may be upheld if the mother voluntarily agrees to the contract
without payment).
33. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(11) (2008)
(defining embryo transfer as "all medical and laboratory procedures that are necessary
to effectuate the transfer of an embryo into the uterine cavity").
34. See id. § 102(16) (defining a gestational surrogate as "a woman into whom an
embryo formed using eggs other than her own is transferred").
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material of the intended parents. 35 The claim was disputed by the husband
and wife who had hired her to gestate their embryo. Rejecting the view
that the child could have two legal mothers, the California court ruled that
the genetic mother (egg provider) who was also the intended mother under
the surrogacy agreement was the legal mother.36
The result in the Calvert case was easier to reach when the birth mother
was not a "traditional" surrogate carrier as she was in the Baby M case.
But suppose neither the gestational carrier nor the intended mother is the
genetic mother of the child.37 An example is found in another California
case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, which, while technically involving the
question of paternal child support, also necessarily implicated maternity
when the trial judge erroneously ruled that the child had no legal parents.38
In that case the intended parents (a divorcing husband and wife) had no
genetic connection to the child because donated sperm and eggs were used
to produce the embryo. 39 The surrogate carrier, who renounced any
parental rights she may have had, also had no genetic connection to the
child she had birthed.4 ° In applying the principle that parentage in
gestational surrogacy cases is determined by the intended parents who set
the pregnancy in motion, the court determined that the husband and wife
were the legal parents.4 1
As a result of the developing case law, what were previously mundane
words began to assume particular importance. This importance is best
illustrated by the changing statutory language used to describe the role of
the birth mother in gestational surrogacy cases. Words such as "parent,"
"mother," and "father" became terms, which carried different meanings in
relation to other statutes. Such words also began to embody both a legal

35. See 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (concluding that the genetic mother is the
natural, and also legal, mother of the child).
36. Id. Butsee Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 677 (Cal. 2005) (qualifying the
earlier view in Johnson that a child cannot have two legal mothers by ruling that a
female domestic partner who encouraged her former partner to have a child by assisted
reproduction could be held liable for child support).
37. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(19) (defining an
"intended parent" as "an individual, married or unmarried, who manifests the intent as
provided in this Act to be legally bound as the parent of a child resulting from assisted
or collaborative reproduction").
38. See 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing the trial
court's determination as to parentage and finding that given their "initiating role as the
intended parents in [the child's] conception and birth," Luanne and John Buzzanca are
to be considered the lawful parents of the child to which they have no biological link).
39. Id. at 282.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 292 (asserting that a couples' inability to get pregnant does not
preclude legal parenthood through surrogacy, as the couple still deliberately engages in
"procreative conduct").
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and social understanding of familial rights and obligations.42 In discussing
some of the early surrogacy cases, it is clear that gestational surrogacy has
the advantage of avoiding the kinds of definitional problems inherent in
traditional surrogacy when the birth mother is also the genetic mother.4 3
But in a gestational surrogacy arrangement a woman may be the "birth
mother," but not be either the "genetic mother" or the "intended mother,"
and this distinction may justify her not being treated as the "legal mother"
in a state which does not apply the "birth mother" rule to determine
maternity.
The first proposed uniform act on surrogacy, the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act, proposed to qualify a carrier's
maternity by use of the term "surrogate mother., 44 But there was a
problem inherent in this phrase. The word "surrogate" is both demeaning
and technically inaccurate since it can be interpreted to mean she is acting
as a mere substitute for another.45 But as the birth mother, such a woman is
actually fulfilling a vital maternal role in carrying and giving birth to a
child.46 The next attempt to find a suitable name for the birth mother in
surrogacy arrangements came with the proposal of the second version of
the Uniform Parentage Act in 2000 (amended in 2002), which described
the woman as a "gestational mother., 47 This description suggested that the
48
birth mother is in fact a "mother," whether or not she is a "legal mother.
42. See Hill, supra note 13, at 362 (noting the implicit difficulty of formalistically
defining "parent," "mother," and "father" because such definitions would omit social,
legal, and moral considerations pertinent to the social construction of parenthood as an
institution).
43. See id.at 371-72 (comparing court decisions providing genetic donors and
intended parents custody when a surrogate reneged on pre-birth agreements under state
laws creating an irrebuttable presumption of motherhood in favor of birth mothers).
44. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION Act § 1(4), 9C U.L.A.
363 (2001 & Supp. 2008) (defining "surrogate" as "an adult woman who enters into an
agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted conception for intended parents").
The Act was proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws in 1988, but was withdrawn by the Commissioners in favor of the Unif.
Parentage Act (2000). See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), prefatory comment, 9B
U.L.A. 360 (2001 & Supp. 2008) (noting that with the promulgation of the Unif.

Parentage Act, all prior uniform acts dealing with parentage issues were withdrawn).

45. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 2000 Art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 360,
360-61 (2001 & Supp. 2008); see also Hill, supra note 13, at 367-68 (highlighting the
divergent interpretations of the rights afforded to surrogate mothers, ranging from none
to full parental rights).
46. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 797 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("[t]he
majority recognizes no meaningful contribution by a woman who agrees to carry a

fetus to term for the genetic mother beyond that of mere employment to perform a
specified biological function... . [A] pregnant woman's commitment to the unborn
child she carries in not just physical; it is psychological and emotional as well.").
47. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) Art. 8 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001 &
Supp. 2008).
48. See id. (omitting the use of mother for the intended female parent while

referring to the gestational mother as "mother" in stating the requirement that either she
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The A.B.A. Model Act clarifies this language by referring to a woman who
births a child for another as a "gestational carrier" rather than a "gestational
mother. 4 9 Yet, while the Model Act terminology is clearer, it also may
cause some confusion in the light of the prior case law, discussed above, by
including within the definition of gestational carrier both a traditional
surrogate and a gestational surrogate. 50 This reflects the view common
among lawyers practicing in the assisted reproduction field that there
should not be a distinction between traditional or gestational carriers and
that both groups should simply be treated as a single group apart from the
intended parents.5 In the absence of legislation such as the Model Act, it is
likely that some courts will continue to draw distinction between traditional
and gestational carriers in resolving maternity issues.
3. Alternative Surrogacy Arrangements
Having noted the distinctions discussed above, an optional form of
surrogacy made available under the Model Act needs further analysis. The
Model Act proposes in Article 7 that a state may consider either a form of
surrogacy which provides for judicial approval of an agreement (called
"Alternative A"), or a form of surrogacy effectuated by a self-executing
contract (called "Alternative B"). 52 Either alternative has an advantage
over the absence of any specific law for determining maternity in surrogacy
cases, which unfortunately characterizes the current law in most states.
Alternative A is adopted from the Uniform Parentage Act. 53 Alternative B
is derived from the language of the Illinois Gestational Carrier Act 54 and
provides specific requirements which must be met before a gestational
carrier agreement becomes a self-executing contract. The contract serves
to establish that the intended parents have legal parentage and that the
gestational carrier has no maternal interests. 5 However, under Alternative
or the intended parents reside within the state for at least ninety days).
49. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(16) (2008).

50. Id. (defining a gestational carrier as "an adult woman, not an intended parent,
who enters into a gestational agreement to bear a child, whether or not she has any
genetic relationship to the resulting child").
51. See Hill, supra note 13, at 370-71 (noting that courts' application of the term
"biology" in maternity suits can be equivocal because it implicates the tension between
genetic and gestational procreation).
52. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 703 (providing divergent

requirements for "Alternative A" and "Alternative B" gestational agreements).
53. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) Art. 8 §§ 801-03 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A.
363-64 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
54. ILL. COMP. STAT § 47/5 (2009).
55. MODEL ACT GOVERNING AssISTED REPROD. TECH. § 701 (providing that when

the contract complies with the provisions of the law, the intended parents immediately
become the legal parents upon the birth of the child, immediately have the right to
custody upon birth, and neither the gestational carrier nor her legal spouse have any
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B, at least one of the intended parents must have contributed a gamete to
the embryo that the carrier is to gestate, which reduces the danger of the
situation like that in In Re Marriage of Buzzanca, in which neither the
intended mother or the gestational carrier had any connection to the child.56
For this reason, the Model Act contains the following definition of
"gestational carrier arrangement," applicable only to Alternative B: "the
process by which a woman attempts to carry and give birth to a child
created by in vitro fertilization using the gamete or gametes of at least one
of the intended parents and to which the gestational carrier has made no
genetic contribution. 57
4. Surrogacy and the Birth Mother Test
A decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania illustrates the problem
with relying on the traditional birth mother test to determine legal
maternity. 58 A male professor in Ohio, who lived with but was not married
to an infertile woman wished to have a child and contacted an Indiana
surrogacy agency. 59 His female companion sold her dental practice in
anticipation of adopting and raising any children produced by surrogacy.6 °
The agency put the professor in contact with a married woman in
Pennsylvania who would serve as a gestational surrogate carrier in return
for a payment of $15,000 or $20,000 in case of a multiple birth. 61 A single
woman in Texas provided the eggs which were fertilized with the
professor's sperm.6 2 The professor, his companion, the surrogate carrier,
her husband, and the egg donor all signed a surrogacy agreement,
recognizing the professor as the father. 63 The surrogate carrier gave birth
to triplets, then decided to keep the children, and left the hospital with the
triplets. The father then brought an action against the gestational carrier to
obtain sole custody of the children.64 The trial court ruled that the
gestational carrier "assumed maternity" and was the "legal mother" of the
children, being "more a mother and a parent by her actions than by

parental rights on the birth of the child).
56. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that the Buzzancas

had an embryo implanted in a surrogate mother that did not share their genetic
material).
57. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

102(17).

See J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1266.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1270.
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genetics." 65 The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, later awarded the
genetic father full physical and legal custody of the children, ruling that the
surrogate carrier had no legal parental rights.66 This sad case in which the
parental status of three children went unresolved for the length of a
prolonged litigation, suggests the need for statutory clarity on the issue of
the maternity rights, if any, of a woman who agrees to become pregnant
and give birth for others who are intended parents without the need to have
judges balancing birth, intent, genetics and other factors in order to resolve
the case.67
5. The Genetic Connection Test for Maternity

In paternity cases, the ability to determine a genetic connection between
a putative father and a child has caused the court system to become almost
totally dependent on the use of genetic marker testing.6 8 Paradoxically,
while paternity cases are focused on genetic parenthood, maternity cases
have begun to put less emphasis on birth or genetics than on the social
needs of the child and the diverse nature of modem family life. 69 A
decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee illustrates both the potential
complexity of the maternity issue and the need to consider all of the
competing factors in reaching a decision. 70 A heterosexual couple, Charles
65. Id. at 1280 (noting that the trial court cited no case or statutory law to support
its conclusion that the gestational mother was the legal mother); see also Robert E.
Rains, What the Erie "Surrogate Triplets" Can Teach Legislatures About the Need to
Enact Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008)
(raising the issue of whether such cases can help educate legislatures about the need for
statutory enactments dealing with surrogacy).
66. JF. v. D.B., 897 A.2d at 1281 (determining that the genetic father should have
custody due to disapproval of the gestational carrier's behavior and in the interests of
the children's need for a stable familial situation); see also J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d
873, 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the father had a right to recover by
indemnification the money he had paid to the birth mother/surrogate carrier as provided
in the surrogacy contract when she breached the contract by keeping the children).
67. See J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d at 1270-71 (providing the procedural history of the
case that spanned over three years whereby the father lost custody, then obtained partial
custody, before finally receiving full custody of his children); see also Rains, supra
note 65, at 33 (discussing the dissatisfaction of both the Ohio and Pennsylvania ju ges
regarding the legal ambiguity evident in surrogacy and calling on state legislatures to
unequivocally address parental determinations).
68. See Hill, supra note 13, at 381 (illuminating the factors that the law generally
uses to define fatherhood: "the man's biological relationship with the child, his legal or
social relationship with the child's mother, and the extent of his social and
psychological commitment to the child.").
69. See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 733 (Tenn. 2005) (noting the complex
public policy issues arising from technological advances and non-traditional familial
arrangements).
70. See id. at 730 (clarifying that the complexity of the case would not control
other ambiguous situations determining legal motherhood, including conflicts between
a gestational carrier and an egg donor, as well as those involving a gestational carrier
and a genetically-unrelated but intended mother).
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and Cindy, had an on-again, off-again relationship, but finally decided to
have a child.
Cindy had children and grandchildren from prior
relationships, but was concerned about the viability of her eggs because of
her age (forty-five). 71 The couple therefore sought to conceive by the use
of donor eggs which were fertilized in vitro by Charles's sperm; Cindy
thereafter gave birth to triplets.72 The couple signed a form provided by the
clinic they had consulted which consented to the use of eggs of an
anonymous donor and which included an agreement that Cindy would be
the "mother" of any children created by the procedure.73 When the
relationship between the couple deteriorated and personal and financial
disputes arose between them, Cindy sued to establish Charles's paternity
and to obtain custody and child support.74 Charles defended against the
suit by challenging the legal maternity of Cindy based on the fact that she
had no genetic connection to the children. 75 The Tennessee court noted
that a prior decision, involving a divorce case where the parties disagreed
over the disposition of cryopreserved embryos produced by both of their
genetic contributions,76 should not be interpreted to mean that only the
interests of genetic parents should be protected by law. In determining the
legal maternity of Cindy in this case, the court considered a number of
other factors even in the absence of a genetic maternal connection. These
factors include the intent of the parties to become parents by assisted
reproduction, the woman's reason for serving as the gestator of the
children, and the waiver of any maternal rights by the egg donor. 77 In so
ruling, the Tennessee court rejected Charles' argument that Cindy, in
lacking a genetic connection to the children, was a mere gestational
surrogate for him and not a legal mother.78 In the circumstances of this
71. See id. at 717.
72. See id. at 718 (explaining that one of the two embryos implanted divided to
facilitate the eventual creation of three fetuses).
73. See id. at 717 (illuminating the problematic nature of standardized contract
forms, as the man and woman in this case were not married, but were nevertheless
describes as "husband" and "wife" in the agreement).
74. See id. at 719.
75. See id. at 720 (revealing that Charles sought to obtain sole and exclusive
custody of the triplets).
76. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (asserting that both the
genetic mother and genetic father have a right to determine use of their genetic
materials in the embryos, but that conflicting choices have to be resolved either by
contract or in favor of person seeking to avoid parenthood).
77. See 1n re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 727-30 (reasoning that parental and gestational
carrier intent comports with the policy considerations in Tennessee's familial relations
statutes, but legal agreements waiving parental rights should be respected by the
courts).
78. See id. at 733 (determining that Cindy and Charles voluntarily agreed that she
would serve as the legal mother, Cindy performed the gestational act, and that this case
did not implicate the controversies that arise when the gestator and genetic progenitor
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case, Cindy's role as a birth mother/intended mother weighed the equities
heavily in her favor.79
6. Maternity Under State SurrogacyStatutes
As of the time of the composition of this article no state had enacted the
A.B.A. Model Act.
As discussed below, however, some states have
enacted statutes which govern the use of surrogacy and the maternal status
of the surrogate carrier. The problem which the Model Act would clarify is

illustrated by the highly diverse array of current statutory law dealing with
surrogacy.

An Arizona statute provides that a surrogate "is the legal mother of a
child born as a result of a surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to

custody of that child., 80 When applying the statute to a genetic mother
who provides her fertilized egg to a surrogate-since she herself could not
gestate the pre-embryo-the Arizona appellate court, however, declared the

statute unconstitutional. The court ruled that in denying the genetic mother
equal protection of the laws by declaring the birth mother (surrogate
carrier) to be the legal mother, the statute treated the genetic mother
differently from the genetic father. 81 The statute has not been repealed in
Arizona and perhaps could be construed differently in a challenge
involving a claim of maternity made by an intended mother who contracted
with a gestational carrier to carry a child produced by use of a donated egg.
A few other states have enacted statutes which, by banning enforcement of
surrogacy contracts, would presumably treat the surrogate-birth mother as
the legal mother of the child.8 2 Some states have banned the most common
form of surrogacy in which the surrogate is paid a fee for her services,

3

are two different women).
79. See id.at 730 (reasoning that because Cindy held both the roles of progenitor
and gestator, she fulfilled two of the three factors required to determine legal
motherhood, rendering the third factor, whether the roles were separate, moot).
80. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(D) (2009) (defining a surrogate as a woman,
who under contract, agrees to relinquish her parental rights to a child either if the child
is not genetically related to her or if conceived naturally or by artificial insemination).
81. See Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(disapproving of the fact that the father is afforded a procedure for proving paternity
under the statute, but the mother is not afforded a procedure for proving maternity).
82. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2009) (requiring that a commissioning couple
agree to pay reasonable living, legal, psychological and psychiatric expenses and that a
gestational surrogate must agree to assume maternal rights and responsibilities if
neither member of the commissioning couple is a genetic parent of the child); IND.
CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2008) (prohibiting enforcement of any agreement by a surrogate to
surrender her parental rights or duties); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2008)
(criminalizing surrogacy arrangements); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-18-05 (2008)
(establishing the surrogate as the legal mother of the child); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122
(McKinney 2009) (declaring surrogacy contrary to public policy).
83. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2008) (voiding contracts involving
the termination of parental rights in exchange for compensation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
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and by doing so have effectively banned most arrangements by which an
intended mother can achieve maternity by use of a gestational carrier to
bear her child. In other states there are statutes which recognize surrogacy,
and the intended mother is recognized as the legal mother rather than the
surrogate carrier. 4 Similarly, in some states, the law does not attempt to
define maternal rights arising from surrogacy, but by explicitly eliminating
surrogacy from the provisions of the state's baby-selling statutes, the states
impliedly suggest that a court decision could treat the intended mother as
the legal mother. 85 Although a few states have considered legislation
providing for greater regulation over gamete donation,8 6 there is little law
regulating assisted reproduction in the United States. Few states, as
discussed above, have statutes dealing specifically with maternity in a
surrogacy context, which then forces courts to resolve disputes in a legal
void. Courts have therefore handled these issues on a case-by-case, and not
always consistent, basis.87
The Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology would
provide a potential statutory basis for resolving maternity issues which
arise in the context of surrogacy in place of the current spate of conflicting
laws. The Act attempts to minimize the potential semantic confusion about
maternity by eliminating the word "mother" and describing the birth
§ 9:2713 (2008) (voiding contracts that provide for a valuable consideration to a
surrogate); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045(3) (2008) (prohibiting the payment of money
or anything of value except medical and necessary living expenses to surrogate while
not specifying if this affects parentage rights); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.210 (West
2009) (prohibiting compensation to surrogate except for reasonable medical and legal

expenses).

Banning compensated surrogacy by statute makes unenforceable most

surrogacy arrangements since most women are unwilling to undergo nine months of
pregnancy without compensation and are unwilling to assume the risk that they may be
legally liable for parentage of a child they are agreeing to carry for others. Except in a
rare case such as an inter-family unpaid surrogacy arrangement such as a sister serving
a surrogate carrier for her infertile sister, banning compensation either eliminates
surrogacy or results in "under the table" payments and/or false legal pleadings to
procure approval of the arrangement.
84. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 26, at 146-82 (explaining why the
statutory laws of Arkansas, Illinois, New Hampshire, Utah, Virginia, and Washington
could be interpreted as creating maternal rights in the intended mother rather than the
surrogate).
85. See ALA. CODE, § 26-1OA-34(a)-(b) (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN., § 710.11
(West 2009); W. VA. CODE, § 48-22-803(e)(3) (2008).
86. See Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for NonAnonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 10-11 (2008) (noting unsuccessful
attempts to pass legislation in a few states).
87. See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr. 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1140
(Mass. 2001) (allowing pre-birth orders to determine maternity of child scheduled to be
born to a surrogate carrier). Contra A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (disallowing a pre-birth order for termination of a surrogate carrier's
parental rights and noting that after birth, the carrier may decide in seventy-two hours
whether or not to surrender the child since the birth certificate need not be prepared,
and list the parents, until forty-eight hours after that).
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mother as a "gestational carrier. 88 A gestational carrier is defined as
[A]n adult woman, not an intended parent, who enters into a gestational
agreement to bear a child, whether or not she has any genetic
relationship to the resulting child. Both a traditional surrogate (a woman
who undergoes insemination and fertilization of her own eggs in vitro)
and a gestational surrogate (a woman into whom an embryo formed
89
using an egg other than her own is transferred) are gestational carriers.
This language is superior to earlier proposals and most existing state
laws since it eliminates both the word "surrogate" and the word "mother"
which may suggest a legal parent-child relationship which in fact is
nullified by the gestational agreement. 90 From a terminology perspective,
none of these proposals are perfect and in fact reflect the doubts which
have been raised in various legal decisions about the status of the birth
mother. The truth of the matter is that the status of the birth mother does,
and should depend on a combination of factors, including the context in
which the question about the interests of the birth mother is asked, the
specific waivers and rights contained in the surrogacy arrangements, and
the requirements of applicable statutory law, regulatory law, and case law.
Despite these legal vagaries, the Model Act is a step toward recognizing the
reality of the maternal statuses of both the woman who gives birth to the
child and the intended mother for whom the former gestates the child.
7. Controversies in GestationalSurrogacy

The Model Act states that except as otherwise provided "the woman who
gives birth to a child is presumed to be the mother of that child for purposes
of state law." 9' The exception to this principle is, of course, the status of
the gestational carrier who gives birth but does so for others, and is not the
legal mother if the state recognizes surrogacy.92 But one might ask: if the
gestational carrier receives a fee for gestating a child which is to be turned
over to another, how does this differ from baby-selling? It may be
rationalized that statutes prohibiting baby-selling were enacted in
conjunction with adoption laws to prevent the black-marketing of
children. 93
Defenders of surrogacy would counter-argue that if
88.

MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §

102(16) (2008).

89. Id.
90. See id § 102(15) (clarifying that a gestational agreement is a "contract between
intended parents and a gestational carrier intended to result in a live birth").
91. Id. § 701(1).

92. See id § 102(16) (defining gestational carrier as an adult woman who enters
into an agreement to bear a child to which she is not the intended parent).
93. See Bjorkman, supra note 11, at 148 (arguing the surrogacy process in assisted
reproductive technologies is often perceived to be similar to baby-selling due to the
exchange of money between the intended parents and surrogate mother in consideration
for a child); see also Richard R. Carlson, TransnationalAdoption of Children, 23
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compensation is not allowed it would either end the practice of surrogacy
except in a very few cases or else would drive the payment of fees
underground.9 4 Although there is no persuasive evidence, this may be
happening in Canada which now bans compensated surrogacy, where
persons seeking surrogacy services may seek help from United States
providers or may just make "off the record" or "under the table"
payments.95
The Model Act forthrightly takes the position that
"consideration, if any, paid to a donor or prospective gestational carrier
must be reasonable and negotiated in good faith between the parties, 96 but
may not be "conditioned upon the purported quality or genome-related
traits of the gametes or embryos" '97 or on "actual genotopic or phenotypic
characteristics of the donor or of the child." 98 The Model Act defines
"compensation" as "payment of any valuable consideration for time, effort,
pain, and/or risk to health in excess of reasonable medical and ancillary
costs." 99 If the Model Act were adopted in a particular state, this definition
could be read as avoiding the baby-selling provisions of an adoption statute
since the compensation as a matter of law would not be for the transfer of
the baby but for the gestational carrier's time, effort, pain, and risk to
health over and above any costs for such things as "medical, legal, or other
100
professional services."
Another aspect of the contradictions created by gestational surrogacy is
the argument that it is "renting of the womb and this sale exploits women
because it is akin to prostitution .... [As in prostitution] where a woman
sells her sexual services, a surrogate sells her reproductive services for a
fee." 10 1 Stated another way, this argument revolves around the question of
TULSA L. J. 317, 370 (1988) (noting that the widespread concern alleging black market
baby schemes contributes to the states' reluctance to relinquish their authority to decide
a child's adoptability).
94. See Bjorkman, supra note 11, at 148-49 (highlighting that most women are
unwilling to give up an entire year of their lives without some form of compensation
for their services and that many supporters of surro~acy view that a woman should
have freedom of choice over what she decides to do with her body).
95. See The Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.C., ch.2 (Can.).
96. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 802(1) (2008).
97. Id. § 802(2).

98. Id. § 802(3) (arguing that the provisions regarding conditioning of
compensation in §§ 802(2) and 802(3) have primary application to gamete donors
rather than gestational carriers, except when the carrier is also the egg provider,
commonly called "traditional surrogacy").
99. Id. § 102(6).
100. See id. at Alternative B, § 703(4)(d) (highlighting that a gestational agreement

is enforceable if the agreement reimburses the gestational carrier for reasonable
expenses).
101. See Zehr, supra note 32, at 314-15 (discussing that opponents to surrogacy
argue that poor women will "flock" to become surrogates to make money and that there
is no real choice for these women because it is either to stay poor or to be exploited).
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a typically poor woman providing birth mothering services for typically
wealthier people. 102 There have been reports of wealthier North American
and European women in effect off-shoring their pregnancies by hiring poor
women in India as gestational carriers.10 3 It can be argued that this is
exploitation of poor Indian women, but counter-argued that they choose to
do so since they can make much more money (by the standards of India)
than by any other employment and do so in a medically secure
environment.10 4 The issue of exploitation versus economic opportunity is
one which cannot be resolved by the Model Act and would probably
require international and treaty agreements to either ban the practice or put
safeguards in place to insure that these birth mothers are protected.
B. Maternity and Female Same-Sex Couples
The language of the law has increasingly become gender neutral in the
last decade. This trend is reflected in such proposals as the A.B.A. Model
Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, which employs words
such as "individual, ' 05 "parent,"'1 6 "donor,"' 107 or "legal spouse,"' 0 8 rather
than terms designating a gender. There are exceptions for cases where a
gender designation is appropriate, but for the most part gender neutrality is
appropriate when possible in a contemporary statute.
The need to rethink common concepts of maternity might best be seen in
the context of mothering claims asserted in disputes among parties to
102. See Thomas Frank, Rent-a- Womb Is Where Market Logic Leads, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 10, 2008, at A17 (describing the wife of a hedge-fund billionaire who documented
her experiences with a surrogate; the surrogate's own daughter also acts as a surrogate

and is using the proceeds to pay for college); Cheryl Miller, Outsourcing Childbirth,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2008, at W 11(noting that some surrogacy agencies in the U.S.

encourage their clients to give their surrogates the "princess treatment" and lavish them
with gifts, but also noting that there are no shortage of surrogacy scams, citing a South
Carolina woman who cheated couples out of $14,000).

103. See Amelia Gentleman, India Nurtures Business of Surrogate Motherhood,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at A9 (reporting that the average cost for surrogate mothers
in India is around $25,000, approximately one-third price in the United States).
104. See id. (describing that couples which perform off-shoring argue that they are
not exploiting Indian women due to the abject poverty that they live in and the benefits
that they receive as a result of the surrogacy).
105. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 604 (2008) (dealing
with consent by an "individual" and eliminating the term of consent by a "woman and a
man" used by the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000).
106. See id. at Alternative A, § 701(2) (defining gestational agreement as referring
to "intended parents" and eliminates the words "man and the woman" used in the in the
Uniform Parentage Act of 2000).
107. See id. § 102(9) (defining a donor as "an individual who produces eggs or
sperm used for assisted reproduction," avoiding any distinction as to the gender of the
donor).
108. See id. § 102(21) (attempting to avoid entanglement with the gender issues
arising from the same-sex marriage controversy by defining a legal spouse in terms of
gender-neutral legal relationships "substantially equivalent" to marriage).
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former same-sex female relationships.10 9 Susan F. Appleton noted that in
regard to once-common stereotypes of parentage, "new laws governing
same-sex couples take the next step, establishing apparently gender-neutral
parentage rules."' 0 Except when adoption is an option, lesbian couples
who wish to have children must of necessity use assisted reproductive
technology. "[T]here is no dispute that many gay and lesbian couples are
having children through ART, so that one partner will have a genetic tie to
their offspring." ''
The growing number of reported decisions involving
lesbian couples reflects a serious struggle to develop law which can serve
both the interest of the adult parties 12and the best interests of their children
conceived by assisted reproduction.
1. The Needfor Statutory Clarity,Evidenced by Inconsistencies in Case
Law
In the absence of any controlling law such as that reflected in the Model
Act, issues of maternity which arise in same-sex unions have been decided
differently by different courts. 1 3 Where same-sex unions are accorded
15
14
legal recognition as marriages,' civil unions, or domestic partnerships,
109. See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 483
(suggesting that the current doctrines used to establish parenthood have created "gross"
inconsistent results across state lines).
110. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REv. 227, 240 (2006).
111. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies. Invisible Barriers,
Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 33 (2008).

112. See, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Mass. 2006) (questioning if a
former partner of a same-sex couple can assert custody and support rights for a nonbiological minor child as a "de facto parent"); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.W.2d 886, 888
(Mass. 1999) (deciding whether visitation rights are in the best interest of a child when
a same-sex couple ends their relationship and the biological mother keeps the child).
See generally Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 459

(suggesting that an expanded definition of parenthood is needed that protects parental
autonomy while serving the best interests of children).
113. See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 482

(arguing that the philosophical divide between state courts and within the Supreme
Court reflects the tension between accepting the realities of the complexities of the
modem family and trying to maintain a fictional account of familial homogeneity).
114. See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (striking down
state bans on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional), superceded by referendum, CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (2008) (declaring that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California"); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v.
Dep't. of Pub. Health, 789 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The three preceding cases each
struck down a state's ban on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Maine have enacted legislation approving same-sex marriage and
eliminating civil unions when the marriage law becomes effective. The California
decision in In re Marriage Cases was later overturned by the Proposition 8 referendum
approved by voters on November 4, 2008, amending California state constitution to
prohibit recognition of same-sex marriages. In Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal.
2009), the Supreme Court of California upheld the referendum, but recognized as legal
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the Model Act would define the partners as legal spouses. This means that
each of the partners is "an individual married to another, or who has a legal
relationship to another that this state accords rights and responsibilities
equal to, or substantially equivalent to, those of marriage."' 16 Under the
Model Act, both of the female legal spouses in such a relationship will be
considered the legal parents of a child born to one of them by assisted
reproduction, except in certain well-defined circumstances." 17 This
contrasts with the .Uniform Parentage Act which applies presumptive
parenthood only on a male.'"1 8 If the Model Act becomes law then in a state
with a civil union or domestic partnership law, the female partners would
both be treated as the presumptive dual mothers1 9of a child born to one of
them without the need to consider other factors.
It may be possible for the same-sex partner of a birth mother to be
treated as a mother under a statutory interpretation 120 or under some other
legal theory such as defacto parenthood'12 even in the absence of marriage
the same-sex marriages which were formalized prior to the referendum.
115. See generally Keith R. Richburg, Vermont Lifts Drive for Gay Marriage,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al (noting that same-sex civil unions or domestic
partnerships are legal in California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, New
Jersey, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Washington).
116. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(21) (2008).
117. See id. § 605 (providing for a two year window for a legal spouse to challenge
parentage of a child born to the other spouse except in cases where the court finds that
the legal spouse did not consent to assisted reproduction or provide gametes, or the
legal spouses have not cohabited since the assisted reproduction and the legal spouse
never openly held out the child as his or her own).
118. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204, 9B U.L.A. 311 (2001 & Supp. 2008)
(creating a presumption of paternity based on marriage, consent to be the father, or
cohabitation with the child or two years after birth combined with a holding out that
the child is his own).
119. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970 (Vt. 2006) (ruling that
in a dissolution of a civil union the partner of the biological mother whose child was
conceived by artificial insemination during the union was also the mother of the child).
The court, however, did not rely exclusively on the civil union status, but also
considered the intention of the parties, the partner's participation in prenatal care and
birth, and the birth mother's identification of the partner as a parent. The court stated
that the partner in a female-female civil union should be treated the same as the male
partner to a heterosexual marriage, where by statute, the husband is presumed to be the
father of a child conceived by artificial insemination. Id.at 970. The Model Act would
activate this conclusion and not make it dependent on inference.
120. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (interpreting
California statute, Fam. Code., § 7611, which creates a presumption of paternity if a
man receives a child into his home and openly holds it out as his natural child, as
applying to a female same-sex unmarried partner who encouraged the mother to
undergo assisted reproduction and treated the child as her own for purposes of
determining that she had a child support obligation).
121. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.L.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (Mass. 1999) (holding
that the female partner in a long-term unmarried relationship with a woman who
became pregnant by assisted reproduction and who jointly raised the child for four
years was a defacto parent entitled to seek visitation with the child, but distinguishing
defacto parenthood from full parental rights).
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or a civil union. A statute clarifying the matter is clearly the most effective
method of imposing parental rights and responsibilities. The difficulty with
current case law is that it does not reflect a secure basis in law to insure the
child's best interests and is so fact-intensive that it cannot produce
universally appropriate results.122 The Model Act, on the other hand,
would provide a window for "parenthood by consent" when same-sex
partners jointly agree to have a child by one of them using assisted
reproduction. The Model Act provides that the partner who either provides
gametes to the birth mother or consents to the use of assisted reproduction
with the intent to become a parent is a parent of the resulting child. 12 3 The
consent of the non-birth mother must be in a signed record. 24 Even in the
absence of written consent, however, the non-birth mother partner may be
ruled to be a parent when the birth mother and the non-birth mother
cohabited in the same household with the child and openly 25held out the
child as their own during the first two years of the child's life.
2. Dual Maternity by Adoption in Same-Sex Unions

Lawyers sometimes counsel the non-parent in a same-sex relationship
that the safest way to insure parental rights for both caregivers of a child
conceived by assisted reproduction is to adopt the child.12 6 In many cases,
however, this does not happen because with the child in the crib and the
adult relationship seemingly strong, the expense and complication of
adoption appears to be unnecessary. 12 7 But if the partnership ends and the
birth parent cuts off visitation of the child by her former partner, the latter
may be in a poor position to assert some sort of de facto claim for contact

122. See A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1073 (Mass. 2006) (declining to treat a
former same-sex partner of the birth mother of a child of assisted conception as a legal
mother, since her primary contributions to the child were financial support rather than
actual involvement in raising the child, as she had failed to adopt the child when she
had an opportunity to do so); T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1253 (Mass. 2004)
(declining to treat the birth mother's former same-sex partner as a legal mother where
they had planned the conception and birth of the child in a co-parenting agreement and
the adult relationship ended before the birth, ruling that the former partner was neither
a defacto parent nor an equitable parent).
123. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH.

§ 603 (2008).

124. Cf id. § 604(1) (stating that because a donor who provides gametes for the use
of the intended parents is not a parent, the donor's individual's written consent is not
needed).
125. Id. § 604(2).
126. See Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition of

Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 58 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (listing the various
ways same-sex couples are able to create a family, including the adoption of a
biological child with assistance of a surrogate or by the other partner).
127. See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 470
(highlighting the various difficulties lesbian couples have in arranging for the nonbiological partner to adopt the biological partner's child).
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with the child. 128 It should be noted that adoption may not be a guaranteed
solution to this problem. 129 While some states have no law either
prohibiting or permitting adoption by same-sex couples, a few states
expressly prohibit the practice of second-parent adoption. 30 Some states
have by court decision13 1 or statute 132 allowed second parent adoption by

same-sex couples, but many have not resolved the issue of recognizing
such judgments entered in other states 133 or they have even prohibited such
recognition. 34 Given this mixed history, reliance on adoption to cement a
legal maternal relationship would be ill-advised.
C. The Deceased Mother

Until the development of assisted reproduction it was impossible for a
woman to have a child after death, but the potential for posthumous
reproduction has now been created by the ability to preserve embryos or
even eggs produced during the lifetime of the biological mother or
128. See id. at 463-64 (arguing that in case of a break-up between a same-sex couple
with a child, the court is ill-prepared to resolve disputes and recognize the
relationship's existence).
129. See COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW ch. 5, 1 (2008), for a thoughtful summary of adoption in
same-sex unions.
130. CompareIn re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056, at *33 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
29, 2008) (declaring a Florida statute unconstitutional because it banned second parent
adoption in the context of same-sex unions), with MISS. CODE ANN., § 93-17-3(5)
(2007) (prohibiting adoption by a same-sex couple), and UTAH CODE ANN., § 78B-6115 (2008) (banning second-parent adoption implicitly by prohibiting non-marital
cohabitation).
131. Compare Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (affirming
joint adoption of child by the birth mother and her female partner who were in a nonmarital same-sex union), and In re K.M. 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(finding that the statute does not bar second parent adoption because nothing in the
statute specifically excludes it), and Sharon S. v. Super. Ct. 73 P.3d 554, 574 (Cal.
2003) (concluding that same sex couples not registered as domestic partners are not
barred from second parent adoption), with In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 686
(Wis. 1994) (ruling that second parent adoption is not allowed even if the trial court
found it to be in the child's best interests), and In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d
374, 382-83 (Neb. 2002) (interpreting the Nebraska adoption statute as not authorizing
adoption by unmarried persons involved in a same-sex relationship because the natural
mother would not surrender her maternal rights).
132. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § I- 102(b) (2009) (allowing adoption of a child
with the mother's permission without the need for the natural parent to terminate her
parental rights).
133. See generally Wasserman, supra note 126, at 10-12 (reviewing different states'
treatment regarding recognition ofjudgments allowing same-sex partner adoption).
134. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 7502-1.4(A) (2008) (prohibiting recognition of
adoption decrees entered in other states or countries when the adopting parents are of
the same-sex, notwithstanding the seeming mandates of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution); see also Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F.
Supp. 2d 1295, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2006) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom, Finstuen
v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the statute violated the Full
Faith and Credit Clause).
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immediately after her death. The following section explores some of the
legal issues raised by this innovation.
The status of a man who died before his child was born has long been
recognized in the law as a legal father of the posthumous child. Likewise,
"[a]n individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that
time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth."'' 35 When
cryopreservation of sperm became possible, the law began to accept the
potential of post-death conception of a child using the sperm of the
deceased father.1 36 Research aimed at improving the preservation of eggs,
and the current ability to cryopreserve embryos also enhanced the ability of
medical science to permit posthumous reproduction. 37 The legal status of
a child as an heir of a deceased gamete provider has arisen in a number of
cases since the use of cryopreserved gametes has become possible. In the
not-always consistent cases involving social security claims by
posthumously conceived children, the courts have asked if the deceased
father consented to the insemination during his lifetime' 38 and if the
39
conception took place reasonably close to the time of his death.
California has enacted a statute intended to deal with posthumous
reproduction by recognizing a child as that of a deceased parent when that
person consented in writing to the posthumous use of his gametes,
and the child exists in utero in two
designated a person who can use them,
40
years or less after the parent's death. 1
While the problem of posthumous reproduction has generally arisen in
regard to paternity, it may at first glance contain a suggestion of how the
law and the courts will deal with posthumous maternity. But the difference
between posthumous paternity and posthumous maternity must not be
ignored. Cryopreservation of eggs has not achieved the practical ease of
135. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 2-108, 9C U.L.A.
363 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
136. See generally W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm
Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942 (1962) (containing the first reference
to the potential of posthumous conception).
137. See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 85 (discussing the property disputes arising
between partners who both contributed to frozen embryos and are claiming ownership).
138. See Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 289-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding a deceased man's consent to the postmortem use of his sperm by his
girlfriend since he both conveyed it to her by a deed of gift and in his will and it is not
contrary to public policy).
139. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that
children conceived ten months after a father's death were his legal dependents);
Woodward v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. Admin. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002)
(holding that children conceived sixteen months after a father's death were his legal
heirs when evidence showed he consented, agreed to support any posthumous children,
and that he was their genetic father). Contra Finely v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849 (Ark.
2008); Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 2007).
140. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2009).
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freezing sperm.141 It is true that when an egg has been fertilized in vitro the
resulting zygote (usually called preembryos or just embryos in the case
law) can be easily cryopreserved, but unlike the posthumous use of sperm,
the resulting entity is the genetic offspring of two persons rather than one,
142
and both of the progenitors have a voice in how it is to be gestated.
Posthumous maternity additionally requires the involvement of a third
party, i.e. the gestational carrier, whereas a widow or other designated
female can confine the posthumous use of sperm to one female. 43 These
differences between paternity and maternity cannot be ignored in any
analysis of posthumous maternity.
In posthumous maternity cases
involving eggs and embryos, the cases involving the placement of sperm
may provide a roadmap for144the courts, but consideration should also be
given to gender differences.
The Model Act does not distinguish between posthumous paternity and
posthumous maternity. It defines posthumous conception as "the transfer
of an embryo or gametes with the intent to produce a live birth after a
gamete provider has died." 145 By not making a distinction between male
and female gamete providers the Model Act leaves it to the courts to sort
out any potential issues arising out of posthumous maternity. Instead, the
Act focuses on the need for a deceased gamete provider to have consented
in a record 146 to the use of the gamete after his or her death.' 47 If a gamete

provider dies before placement of the "eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
141. See Kate Johnson, ASRM: Egg Cryopreservation Still Experimental; Egg,
Ovarian Tissue Cryopreservation Should Not be Marketed to Healthy Women,
According to a New Report, B-NET, Dec. 1, 2004, at 2-3, available at

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mCYD/is2339/ain8581185/.
142. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (disputing the rights of
the husband and wife who had both contributed towards the creation of the embryo).
143. See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tenn. 2005) (reviewing a
maternity dispute where the father was the only one who had a genetic connection to
the children that were a result of his sperm but an anonymous egg donor).
144. Id.
145. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(30) (2008).
146. See id. § 102(33) (defining a record as "information inscribed in a tangible
medium or stored in an electronic or other medium that is retrievable in perceivable
form").
147. See id. § 607 (requiring that in the event that the state has enacted a different
provision in a probate code regarding posthumous reproduction, the Model Act will
defer to the provision). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has approved proposed changes in the Uniform Probate Code which under
certain, well-defined circumstances would recognize the heirship of a posthumously
conceived child. This would require clear consent by the now-deceased parent, that the
child is in utero within thirty-six months of the parent's death, and that the child is born
no later than forty-five months after the parent's death. Proposed UNIF. PROB. CODE,
§§ 2-120(f)(2)(C), 2-120(k). Section 2-121(h) of the proposed Code would achieve the
same result when a gestational carier agreement was court-approved. See UNIF. PROB.
CODE, Art. II, Pt. 1, gen. cmt. (West Supp. 2009).
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deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to
occur after
death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the
, 148
child."
It sometimes happens that a request is made for medical personnel to
remove gametes from a deceased or incompetent person. 49 The Model Act
prohibits such removal unless the person consented in a record during his
or her lifetime or period of competence, or the person's
authorized
150
fiduciary has express authorization to consent to the removal.
However, a request to collect gametes sometimes comes in an
emergency room or medical facility when the donor has died or become
incompetent unexpectedly and a record of consent is not immediately
available. In such a case, loss of viability of the gamete is likely to occur
unless removal takes place immediately. If "a genuine question as to the
existence of consent in a record" arises, the gametes or embryos may be
removed and preserved. 51 If gametes or embryos are collected in such an
emergency situation they may52not be transferred to produce a pregnancy
"unless approved by a Court."'
III. CONCLUSION

It is likely that the use of assisted reproductive technologies will
continue to grow in the future, both as a response to the problem of
infertility and as a solution for same-sex couples. It is also likely that
courts will continue to be called on to decide issues of maternity, especially
in cases involving surrogacy where birth motherhood and genetic
motherhood are separate. Since few states have statutes governing the
consequences of such technology, and those that exist are widely disparate,
it is time for legislatures to consider enacting the American Bar

148. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607 (noting that the use of
the term "deceased spouse" in this provision reflects a view that posthumous use of
gametes or embryos should be used only by a person who is a "legal spouse," i.e.,
either related to the deceased person by marriage or having a "relationship to another
that [the] state accords rights and responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent
to, those of marriage"); see also id.§ 102(21) (recognizing a deceased party to a legal
marriage, legal civil union, or legal registered domestic partnership as entitled to use
the gamete or embryo if the deceased has consented in a record). It may be possible
that in future litigation, the restriction of posthumous reproduction to a spouse may be
challenged as a denial of a deceased non-spouse's right to consent to posthumous
reproduction, but at the time of the drafting of the Model Act, confining legal
recognition to a legal "family" was seen as appropriate by the drafters.
149. See id. prefatory note (discussing the use of new scientific procedures in
reproductive medicine to remove gametes from dead or incapacitated individuals).
150. Id. § 205(1).
151. Id. § 205(2).

152. See id. § 205(3) (creating a "presumption of non-consent" in the absence of a
record showing consent).
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Association's Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology or
something similar to it. The creation of surrogacy agreements are often
multi-jurisdictional transactions, and the absence of law in some states and
diversity of laws in other states creates serious problems in the resolution
of something as important as determining maternal rights and obligations.
Enactment of the Model Act will create a foundation for a more uniform
and consistent legal setting, and will ensure a more rational basis for the
protection of both the mother and the child who is conceived by assisted
reproduction.

